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The President of the Republic at the opening of Forum Balticum in the assembly hall of Tartu University on May 10, 200210.05.2002
A nation state and its defence capability in the 21st century
Honourable Rector,
Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Greeting you at the today's representative forum, I would talk about some key factors of the security of a small country as Estonia is in the today's integrating world. Thereby I would like to point out some aspects I have already mentioned in my speech at Nobel Institute in Oslo on April 10th.
A nation state can build up its future on the inalienable right of the nations to select their own development path. The Estonian history has proved that only the nation that has maintained its national identity can achieve independence. With the help of this national identity the nation can also understand and re-create democratic values. Co-operation with nations that respect the same values guarantees a stable development both for one country and nation and the whole region around it.
Estonia continues in the regional co-operation on the different levels in the 21st century's globalizing world. The co-operation between the three Baltic States has been very close for some years, and it is a great pleasure for me to recognize that the same refers to the Nordic and Baltic States. In addition, we participate in the Baltic Sea States framework. Communication between us and the European Economic Area, the European Union and NATO also becomes progressively closer.
We can see the future world as integrated on the basis of regional interests. The purpose of this process is to guarantee the protection of democratic values and stability in the development of nation states. Different forms of co-operation will create the security network that will defend society.
As another nations and states, Estonia also needs co-operation in order to secure the stable and economic development and safeness of its people, thereby creating new opportunities for the state. From the standpoint of a small country, the co-operation of states in securing social security and a stable development is priceless.
The co-operation in the field of security will guarantee stability. Estonia has clearly expressed its will to become a member of NATO. Thereby we have emphasised that our objective of accession to NATO is not only to consume security but we want to offer partnership in warranting the international security and defending democracy. Estonia as a small country cannot contribute large units but it can offer small and specialized units within the scope of the NATO's tasks.
I would point out the significance of good relationships and co-operation with adjoining countries in the context of stability and security policy. The co-operation between the Baltic States in defence policy has been productive. Common defence projects being developed help us to use our limited resources rationally.
The increasing co-operation with Latvia and Lithuania in the security and military fields is more important than people often recognise. Washington or Brussels see the three Baltic States as a unity, a narrow zone on the shore of the Baltic Sea. Differences and even different opinions that seem to be important for some people are not significant from this point of view. Our potential allies are certainly waiting for more clear evidence of our reliability. The ability of three Baltic States to cooperate is one of the more important factors that will indicate this reliability.
Indeed, we have several military cooperation projects - the common project BALTBAT, which is mainly created for peacekeeping tasks, the joint air surveillance system BALTNET, the squadron of destroyers BALTRON and of course, the Baltic Defence College here in Tartu is training senior staff officers and was established with the help of NATO and partner countries. The college has done a lot for unification of military thought and staff-work in the three states.
But none of these projects have a sufficient "ceiling" of security policy that will guarantee military assistance by two other Baltic States in case of crisis or aggression against one of the Baltic States - looking for example, within the existing projects. This problem will be settled if all Baltic States will achieve the status of the full members of NATO.
(But until then it would be appropriate to think about creating this "ceiling". Poor cooperation between the Baltic States was one important factor regarding what happened in 1939-40.)
The simultaneous accession of three Baltic States to NATO is a logical step both from the military and political point of view. This will create a new security situation in the Baltic Sea region and increases safeness and stability in the whole Europe.
From the same point of view we see the development of relationships between Estonia and Russia, the basis of which includes principles of a good-neighbourliness and a mutually beneficial co-operation that takes into account interests of both countries. Common activities in the Baltic Sea region that take into account important interests of both parties will give a new content and new dimensions to this co-operation. It is also in Estonia's interests that Russia would not feel that its national interests are restricted by NATO's possible enlargement. We believe that integration that strives to achieve stability will give additional security guarantees to every European country.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
The rightness of Estonian choices and the results of its activities have been proved by the increasing support of our people to accession to NATO. Activities in reinforcing our legislative basis and an increasing percentage of spending on defence in the state budget have also been effective; this year the percentage is 2% of the gross domestic product. I have to mention the consensus between political powers represented in our parliament of approving the state security concept in 2001.
Stability is certainly the most important factor in security policy and national defence. The formation of a defence system may take some years or even decades. Sudden changes in the taken course are unthinkable.
Therefore, there is no need for changing standpoints stated in the Guidelines of the National Defence Policy of Estonia approved by the Riigikogu on May 7, 1996 or in the National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia ratified on March 6, 2001 before achieving the status of a full member in North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. On the contrary - today it is important to apply maximum efforts so that the provisions of these basic documents would not be empty words.
Which obstacles may wait us in the way of our development?
Possible instability and politically uncontrollable international crises and unforeseeable situations for the security environment in future can be considered as the main security risks. Terrorism, international crime, contraband trade, including drug and weapons trafficking, and potential waves of refugees caused by humanitarian catastrophes and military conflicts are the most important international non-military risks. The abovementioned co-operation between countries and nations can dispel those risks.
Unfortunately economic risks are being deepened by integration. The small economy of Estonia will be influenced by potential global economic recessions because of its openness and strong integration. Dependence on the import of gas and liquid fuel and on the sole supplier in case of gas is also a risk factor. The Estonian power system is also vulnerable because of a monopoly and connection to the Russian power system. We need strategic solutions that will increase our security here: creating a strategic reserve of fuel, extending access to the other gas sources, demonopolization of energetics. Economic relations of Estonia should be as various as possible.
Environmental risks emerge from among so-called "new risks". Nuclear power stations built once in the Soviet Union represent a high environmental hazard; the other large industrial enterprises, chemical works for instance, are also connected with environmental catastrophes.
Increasing social conflicts and social ranking in society and people's being alienated to the state, resultant to this, are the more important internal security risks. The spread of drug addiction and AIDS that are today's fatal illnesses but also increasing crime are partly consequences of the aforesaid.
The restoration of the independence of Estonia was positively unforeseen. Could anybody have predicted in 1982 that Estonia would be free in 1992? But at the same time - could anybody have imagined, even in his most terrifying dreams, in early 1930s, what would Estonian fate be like ten years later? Hardly anyone. For that reason, "blue-eyed selfishness", excessive looking after people's own interests or taking their chances should not exist in security policy and national defence. Only national interests, pragmatism, realities, collectivism and long-time preparations will function in security policy and national defence. People should follow the principle: "Hope for the best but prepare for the worst!"
The list of these security risks was not intended to be a dismal picture for our eyes. Unfortunately they are facts of the world surrounding us. It is also the fact that Estonia lost 17 per cent of its citizens as dead in 1940-53. But if we add refugees and deportees, we can say that Estonia lost almost every fourth person. And it is also the fact that in local wars of last few decades the losses of civilian population constitute more than 90 per cent of the total number of losses.
It is clear that there can be only one key factor by building up the national defence system in Estonia - minimising losses among the civilian population. This and the readiness to react to several security risks can be achieved only by the aid of total defence system that includes the whole society.
The principle of the total defence has been determined in our basic documents on security policy and specific tasks of the Government of Estonia, different ministries and institutions and the Ministry of Defence have been determined in the Peace-Time National Defence Act and in the other legislative instruments. Every politician and official can ask himself what has been done in that field during last few years.
Of course, high expectations are put forward in connection with our efforts to become a member of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation. At this point we should remember that NATO's different member countries have also very different armies. For example, we cannot compare the defence forces of USA with Danish defence forces or Turkish defence forces with Luxembourg's. One of NATO's member countries - Iceland - does not have an army at all.
Language and communication skills and cooperation abilities and procedures on the level of staffs are more important than calibre of guns or similar indicators if we try to achieve the power to cooperate with NATO. We should learn from East European countries that have recently acceded to NATO. At the same time our national defence solutions will be our internal matters, as the structure of defence forces of every NATO's member country is their internal matter.
The basic documents of the Estonian security policy state the development of independent defence as a precondition of maintenance of our national independence. At the same time the establishment of war-time defence forces concentrating on land forces and based on the balanced development of territorial and manoeuvre elements.
I am not an expert at particulars of military defence, for example, in matters like how many days we must withstand until allies come or how battalions are necessary to repel so many units of the enemy. Let us leave those subjects under the military experts' care. But it is clear that assistance can be rendered only to the subject that exists at the moment of assistance and is capable to receive it. For that reason we cannot underestimate the importance of land forces as a part of the defence forces in future.
There is no need to correct the other basic principles of the defence policy stated in the abovementioned documents now. War-time defence forces built up by the principles of the territorial defence remain the best way to arrange the military defence of Estonia. The doctrine of the active territorial defence, that has been developed in the Baltic Defence College under the guidance of NATO officers for every three Baltic States and officially approved by the Defence Forces of Estonia, is the most economic solution for the arrangement of the military forces.
The general conscript service obligation and a reserve army based on mobilisation is still the only possible way to create elementary quantitative conditions to repel a widespread military attack. More important is that the key factor of the military defence - the will to defend - may be guaranteed only by involving the whole society in building up the national defence. It means that the general conscript service obligation should be emphasised as a part of the national defence.
At the same time some units of the defence forces may due to their tasks or the speed of reaction be professional or regular units. Optimality and rationality are the criteria in every specific case.
As the supreme commander of the national defence, I would like to emphasise that national defence questions are the competence of the Estonian parliament - Riigikogu - that approves and, in case of need, updates the basic documents on security policy. Consequently, people will decide those questions through their elected representatives. The Estonian people and our potential allies need stability. As they are waiting for actual work and results in carrying into effect our purposes.
Thank you for your attention!
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